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Abstract 
It is well known that EU citizenship is parasitic upon national citizenship. To 
become an EU citizen it is necessary to be a citizen of one of the Member States, 
and the states have exclusive competence to decide who their own citizens are. 
They therefore function as gatekeepers, and jealously guard this role. However, in 
practice national citizenship and nationality laws are influenced by EU membership. 
Firstly, this influence comes from other Member States, who recognise that the 
decision on citizenship taken by their neighbours have, as a result of rights of free 
movement and non-discrimination a direct impact upon themselves. Secondly, 
there is an influence from the EU institutions and EU legislation, for example by 
granting rights to long-term third country national residents. Since periods of 
residence are often a central criterion for gaining nationality, EU residence rights 
effectively amount to EU support for national citizenship for these residents. These 
points are made using the examples of Spain, Ireland and Germany, all of which 
have made changes to nationality laws, or exercised nationality decisions, in a way 
where the influences above can be demonstrated. The long-term residents 
directive is used to show the influence of the EU itself. These empirical findings are 
placed in the context of current debates on the nature of citizenship, and on 
methods of harmonisation, in particular the increasing use of soft and reflexive 
methods. 
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Introduction   
This article addresses the relationship between European Union citizenship and reform 
of national citizenship and nationality laws. It notes and describes a parallel 
development of the two which undermines the traditional perception of national 
sovereignty over matters of nationality.  
Introducing EU citizenship was a significant and controversial moment in the 
European integration process. Firstly, it provoked strong objections from the MS to 
delegation of powers to the EU level in the domain of nationality policy. Although 
acquisition of national citizenship remained in the states’ discretion, it did not prevent 
certain countries from expressing worries that Community citizenship threatened their 
independence. In fact, as it will be shown, granting all MS nationals the status of EU 
citizen has increased the interdependence of nationality policies. Changes in this field 
introduced at the national level no longer have exclusively domestic impact, but affect 
other MS and some convergence of national law is already observable. Thus, it will be 
claimed that a perceived need to harmonise legislation in this area is emerging. Can 
this trend be interpreted as the result of reflexive harmonisation?  
Secondly, adopting Union citizenship created a debate on the position of third country 
nationals residing in the EU. Excluding foreign residents from Union citizenship 
deteriorated their relative position in European societies. Are the reforms facilitating 
access to national citizenship a reaction to, or a result of this deterioration, and hence 
ultimately of Union citizenship? Also, how has the EU reacted to the deepened gulf 
between EU and non-EU citizens? The Council Directive on third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents harmonises the conditions for acquiring the status of 
long-term resident in all MS and grants them a certain set of rights. Although aiming 
to provide rights compensating for exclusion from Union citizenship, the directive 
may also light a path towards it. It has wide implications.  
Last but not least, introducing the status of EU citizen violated the traditional 
understanding of citizenship, which associated it solely with then nation state. Can 
decoupling the two change ideas of identity and belonging?  
The aims of this article are threefold. Firstly, it will be argued that changes to 
nationality legislation have been implemented under the pressure of other MS and as a 
result of adopting EU citizenship. It will be claimed that EU countries are encouraged 
to harmonise their laws without this involving legal provisions at the Community 
level. However, attention will be also drawn to the fact that EU acts adopted by the 
MS indirectly interfere in what is thought to be an exclusively national domain. The 
second objective is to suggest that in this context soft law instruments are generally 
more desirable and effective than new hard law acts. Finally, it will be examined 
whether EC law, by inducing changes in nationality, may add depth to EU citizenship 
and lead to the revision of the general concept of citizenship. 
The structure is as follows: the two first chapters provide theoretical background for 
the analysis of practical examples, which is presented in the third part. The first 
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chapter is devoted to the investigation of the idea of citizenship. Attention is 
particularly given to the role of citizenship in creating sense of belonging and its role 
in collective identity. In the second chapter, the idea of reflexive harmonisation as a 
new form of governance is presented. It is shown that the MS are influenced not only 
by legal provisions enshrined in the EC law, but also by soft law instruments, which 
encourage them to adjust their legislations to the ‘acquis communautaire’ voluntarily. 
The third chapter aims at discovering the relationship between Union citizenship and 
national citizenship legislations. The focus is laid on the indirect impact of the 
European Community on national policies via pressure from other states and the long-
term residents directive.  
1. Status of citizen   
Introducing Union citizenship challenged the modern understanding of citizenship, 
which was considered an exclusive attribute of the nation-state. Widening this notion 
raised numerous questions. What does it mean to be a citizen? How does citizenship 
influence one’s identity? Is it possible to share two different levels of citizenship? The 
aim of this chapter is to show how citizenship enhances belonging, and prevents non-
citizens from full membership in a given polity, and to place Union citizenship in the 
context of scholarly thinking about these issues.  
1.1. Citizenship and identity  
The primary feature of citizenship is the conferral of certain rights and obligations.(1) 
Citizens are people who enjoy the same rights and share the same duties. Secondly, 
the concept of citizenship is closely connected with a political community. Since 
ancient Greece ‘those who held power’ have decided who could acquire citizenship. 
Nowadays the political authorities through national legislation grant the status of 
citizen. This leads to a basic definition of citizenship as “a status of full membership 
of a political community”(2),  
According to Goudapel, the notion of citizenship can be viewed from two 
perspectives: functional and non-functional.(3) The functional approach refers to “an 
individual’s membership of a political community”, whereas the non-functional one 
concerns a sense of cultural identity, which is perceived as very difficult to measure in 
a legal context.(4) However, the two views are importantly connected.  
1.1.1. A functional approach   
The first aspect, or the role,(5) of citizenship (according to a functionalist approach) is 
granting rights to individuals. There are three types of rights, which all citizens should 
enjoy, namely civil, political, and social rights, known as Marshall’s triad.(6) 
Regardless of differences between particular national citizenship legislations,(7) 
citizenship always assigns individuals with equal rights and duties. All citizens are 
treated on the same basis, as a fundamental value of citizenship is equality.(8)  
Sharing identical liberties and responsibilities develops a sense of belonging to a given 
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community, which encourages participation and is perceived as a second function of 
citizenship.(9) As Held observed,  
Citizenship has meant a reciprocity of rights against, and duties towards, 
the community. Citizenship has entailed membership, membership of the 
community in which one lives one's life. And membership has invariably 
involved degrees of participation in the community.(10)  
The status of citizen creates a relation between an individual and the authorities of a 
political community as well as affiliation between the members of the community.(11)
By establishing these two-dimensional bonds, citizenship fulfils, according to its 
modern conception, an important organisational role.(12)  
1.1.2. A non-functional approach   
To a certain extent legal links can help foster a sense of ‘common identity and shared 
destiny’, especially in the EU, where law has played a significant role in the 
integration process.(13) This mechanism represents the socio-psychological (non-
functionalist) dimension of citizenship.(14) People enjoying the same rights are more 
likely to establish relationships. The same rights “imply an affiliation with a social and 
historical group, a condition of solidarity […] that is never acquired ‘naturally’”.(15) 
Whereas lack of certain rights ascribed to other members of community leads to the 
feeling of exclusion,(16) or even discrimination. Non-citizens who live within a 
certain community may feel less willing to identify themselves with the citizens. As 
Balibar has said, humanity is divided into “unequal species” by citizenship.(17)  
Citizenship’s role in political community,(18) which can be described as an 
association of individuals who share a common life and therefore are especially 
committed to each other, implies that it binds citizens together.(19) Breton analyzed a 
number of ways in which a system of collective organization (and political community 
is undoubtedly one of those) shapes individual and social identities, and he found that 
people’s conception of themselves depends on the group they belong to.(20) Also 
Verhoeven drew attention to the fact that citizenship implies membership in the 
community, which is closely related to ‘belonging’ and ‘sense of identity’.(21) 
Interestingly, political rights may imply ‘moral membership’, which requires that all 
members of the community participate in the collective decision-making. As La Torre 
pointed out, “political rights are the most important adjunct of membership of a 
community”.(22) Also according to Verhoeven, legitimacy of political action enables 
better identification with a community.(23) Hence, those who are not entitled to vote 
will not be accepted as full members of the community. This brings us to another 
significant issue related to belonging – the perception of non-citizens by citizens. 
There is an evident tendency to treat those, who do not enjoy political rights as 
‘outsiders’.(24) Such an exclusive perception makes integration of non-citizens into 
society more complicated.  
1.2. The concept of Union citizenship   
The concept of Union citizenship emerged long before its formal establishment. The 
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idea had been developing since a very early stage of the Communities,(25) but the 
final provisions were approved during the Luxemburg European Council, and inserted 
into the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht. Among the reasons for introducing Community 
citizenship, there are three of particular importance, namely encouraging free 
movement, reducing the European Union’s democratic deficit, and forming a base for 
the construction of European identity.(26)  
European citizenship is regulated by Articles 17-18 of the European Communities 
Treaty. According to these provisions, Union citizenship is conditional upon national 
citizenship, which makes the concept of citizenship unique. The EU does not have 
legal authority to grant the status of citizen; it can be acquired only through nationality 
of one of the Member States. The exclusive competence of the MS to determine who 
is a national, and therefore an EU citizen, deprives the Community of the right to 
decide who is subjected to the EC law.(27) Issuing legal provisions for ‘unknown’ 
subjects is rightly considered to be anomalous.(28) However, the MS put a veto on 
conferring this right to the EU level, as nationality policy is associated with state 
independence.(29)  
By comparison, in modern states, nationality is granted according to two main 
principles, namely ius soli and ius sanguinis.(30) In countries where the ius soli rule is 
applied, everyone born within their territory acquires nationality automatically. If a 
country adopts the principle of ius sanguinis, the nationality of a child is determined 
by the nationality of the parents regardless of the place of birth.(31) In most cases, 
however, nationality legislations combine these two rules, creating a wide range of 
‘middle solutions’.  
The Maastricht European Citizenship Clause was modified in Amsterdam - the 
additional phrase “Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national 
citizenship” is an evident response to anxiety of the Member States that EU 
citizenship somehow threatens national citizenships.(32)  
Although the list of entitlements linked to Union citizenship seems long, (33) most of 
them are only confirmation or development of rights already existing.(34) The most 
meaningful entitlement granted to EU citizens is political rights. Firstly, involving 
people in the decision-making process contributes to reducing the democratic deficit.
(35) Secondly, the ability to participate in political life strengthens links among 
citizens and between citizens and the state. An awareness of their capacity to influence 
the EU can enhance their feeling of Europeaness. There is “an intimate link between 
giving effect to principles of democracy and the complex identities of EU citizens”,
(36)  
Another significant liberty inherent in Union citizenship is freedom of movement. 
Personal mobility, which is an important factor of Union citizenship, seems to play a 
significant role in identity-building.(37) However, the importance of citizenship here 
is often questioned; some scholars argue that introducing the institution of EU 
citizenship added little substantially new value – it mainly confirmed already existing 
migration law under the EU law. According to these opinions, replacing the notion of 
‘worker’ (or ‘privileged alien’) with ‘Union citizen’(38) held more symbolic than 
Page 6 of 54EIoP: Text 2006-005: Full Text
practical meaning. Nevertheless, moving beyond the status of employee, which may 
seem a minor change, indeed introduced a significant difference. The right of free 
movement decoupled from performance of economic activity potentially embraced all 
MS nationals.(39) Hence, describing Union citizenship as “a purely decorative and 
symbolic institution”(40) does not seem to be right, especially if it is analysed in the 
light of the changes in national citizenship policies of some Member States.(41)  
Interestingly, Union citizenship does not entail any explicit duties at the moment. As 
one of the original reasons of its establishment was overcoming the democratic deficit, 
the focus was laid on assigning rights to EU citizens.(42) However, it does not mean 
that some obligations can not be added to the dynamic concept of Union citizenship, 
which has the prospect for change explicitly built into the mechanisms for its future 
review.(43) The evolutive clause confirms the dynamic character of EU citizenship by 
“recognition of its limited extent at present and a means to improve on its limited 
nature”.(44) The need for amendments in the content of Union citizenship is the 
logical result of the increasing scope of EU competences; the Union should 
consequently grant the rights in these new areas.  
Another distinctive feature of Union citizenship lies in providing EU citizens with a 
new kind of relation. Apart from developing bonds between individuals of a given MS 
(horizontal link), and individuals and their state (vertical link), which is also 
characteristic for national citizenship, it establishes a relation between individuals and 
authorities of other MS (diagonal link?). As Wiener has said, “every citizen of the 
Union enjoys a first circle of nationality rights within a Member State and a second 
circle of new rights enjoyed in any Member State of the EU.”(45) These ties stem 
from ascribing EU citizens with transnational political rights. Firstly, all EU citizens 
are entitled to vote in municipal elections in the host country under the same 
conditions as nationals of that state.(46) Secondly, every holder of EU citizenship has 
a right to vote and stand for elections for the European Parliament on the basis of 
place of residence.(47) Thirdly, the status of Union citizenship guarantees diplomatic 
and consular protection of any MS in a third country if a home state is not represented.
(48) In this sense, implementing Union citizenship contributed to dissociation between 
political participation at European level and MS nationality.(49) Significantly, the two 
first rights undoubtedly facilitated integration of MS nationals, residing in a different 
EU country, with their host environment and enhanced their status as compared with 
third country nationals.(50) In other words, EU citizenship by creating closer relation 
of MS nationals with the authorities of their state of residence ameliorated their 
position in the host country.  
1.2.1. Controversies raised by EU citizenship   
Union citizenship provokes fear of a threat to national citizenship, which is believed to 
be “a last bastion of sovereignty”,(51) and therefore to national identity. According to 
Deloye these worries are not groundless as “European citizenship produces a 
reordering of identities”.(52) Despite its complementary and dispersed character, EU 
citizenship challenges the structure of European identity/identities established by 
particular nation-states.(53) Hence, many Europeans presume that acquiring European 
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citizenship may lead to a new European identity. Rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by 
Denmark illustrates these worries. The negative response of Denmark to the concept 
of Union citizenship was followed by “a declaratory confirmation by the European 
Council that nothing in the provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht in any way displaces 
national citizenship”.(54) Even the founding Treaty stating that the Community is 
supposed to “lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe”,(55) not create one people,(56) does not seem reassuring. As Deloye rightly 
pointed out, an attempt to impose a new configuration of norms and identities, 
endowed by EU citizenship, will face the opposition of numerous social actors.(57) 
The notion of Union citizenship itself may imply an attempt to create one European 
state. As Weiler argues, many understandings of Union citizenship contradict the 
preservation of independent nation-states and lead inevitably to European nation-
building.(58)  
On the contrary, European citizenship and European identity are also perceived as an 
additional level, not interfering with national ones. The concept of ‘multiple demos’ 
indicates that one can simultaneously belong to different levels of a community.(59) 
Practical examples prove that some people do not have problems with admitting to 
being a part of two communities. Migrants often tend to describe themselves as 
Scottish British or Bavarian German.(60) The phenomenon of combining several 
layers of identities is described in detail by Hofstede, who states that “almost everyone 
belongs to a number of groups and categories of people at the same time”(61); hence 
sharing at least two identities is a norm. The possibility to combine various levels of 
identities is to a certain extent confirmed by the results of 2002 Eurobarometer survey 
on European and national identity.(62) 59% of Europeans, compared to 52% in 1999, 
(63) admit to some European components in their identity.(64) In the beginning of 
2004, after including 10 candidate countries, this number experienced a slight 
reduction of 3%.(65) Nevertheless, these results show that over half of Europeans 
recognise some European elements in their identity.  
2. Reflexive harmonisation   
2.1. From hard, to hard and soft  
The European integration process has significantly increased the interdependence of 
MS national policies. The EU countries are now so closely linked, largely as a result 
of EU policies such as the internal market, that many decisions taken on the national 
level have a cross-border impact.(66) This has led to increasing competences being 
transferred from the national to the Community level, (67) in what is often described 
as the spillover effect, first described by the neofunctionalist Haas.(68) As another 
neofunctionalist, Lindberg, put it: “the initial task and grant of power to the central 
institutions creates a situation or series of situations that can be dealt with only by 
further expanding the task and the grant of power.”(69) Member States agree to this, 
but often only because they do not see any other option. European integration can be 
explained by the fact that many states recognise the need to join “inter-state and multi-
state networks for functional reasons [without the real will to] subordinate themselves 
to a large comprehensive network”.(70) Many MS are reserved when called upon to 
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adopt common policies on matters that have been hitherto perceived as typically 
national.(71)  
This expanding scope of EU activity, and Member State reluctance, has led to 
discontent over loss of national control over domestic policies. An important factor in 
this has been the sometimes excessive use of hard law, which uses controlling and 
coercive mechanisms to make sure Member States obey the EU entirely. It “creates 
uniform rules that the Member States must adopt, provides sanctions if they fail to do 
so, and allows challenges for non-compliance to be brought in court”.(72) As well as 
claims of over-regulation, the quality, democratic legitimacy, and transparency of 
Community legislation have all been subject to criticism, as well as its diversity-
reducing effect. (73) Generally the abuse of hard law, resulting in ‘over-regulation’, 
leads to eurosceptisism.(74)  
The major reaction can be observed in the increasing use of soft regulations, which do 
not use coercive mechanisms.(75) This is the case in areas of ‘common concern’(76) 
such as employment strategy and social protection where full hard law harmonisation 
is neither feasible nor desirable. Part of the importance of this comes from the fact that 
the general reluctance to act results not only from ‘what’ is expected to be done, but 
very often ‘how’ the action is approached. In other words, willingness to comply with 
common policies depends on the (hard or soft) influence tactics in force.  
Although soft law (deprived of legal force) can not replace traditional legislation,(77) 
and the circumstances in which each should be used are highly discussable, the new 
approaches contribute significantly to enhancing legitimacy of the Community action. 
Moreover in some cases soft law has been more effective than hard. (78) As the 
studies of the influence tactics show, soft methods very often enhance targets to 
commitment, while hard methods usually evoke resistance.(79) Thus it becomes 
evident that instead of creating a rigid ‘European code’ and imposing it on national 
legislations, the emphasis should be put on encouraging diverse, local-level 
approaches, which will lead to adjusting national rules to European standards.  
However, the need for some hard law acts suggests that the most desirable is the 
hybrid constellation of hard and soft law. (80) Moreover, the combination of different 
instruments is widely recognised to enhance effectiveness of decision making.(81) In 
other words, “an undeniable and legitimate function of soft law is to support and 
promote, in accordance with legal means, the goals of the Community in the process 
of integration.”(82)  
2.2. Soft law and reflexive harmonisation   
Soft law can be characterised by several, important features. Firstly, it has an entirely 
voluntary character. Secondly, it is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity (which 
is sometimes thought to be a solution to the heterogeneous character of Europe),(83) 
which means that it encourages allocation of the competences in various policy fields 
to the most appropriate levels of governance. Thirdly, it focuses on establishing 
general guidelines, leaving the MS discretion in choosing the most suitable national 
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strategy. Finally, soft law aims at mutual learning through peer reviews, where all 
relevant stakeholders discuss common concerns, exchange knowledge and experience 
that allows them to compile the best solutions to their regulatory problems. Therefore, 
soft law “may be viewed as a useful form of regulation, a means of co-ordinating 
relations among the MS and of balancing unity and diversity.”(84)  
Features of soft law provide excellent conditions to induce second-order effects. These 
occur when national authorities are stimulated to revise the adequacy of national 
policies in the light of the European integration process, without any direct pressure 
from the EU to do so. As noted by Romanos “it is acknowledged that political 
institutions can have a second order effect by shaping the preferences and ideas of 
collective actors.”(85) Realising need for changes themselves, as the result of peer 
review and observation, will make Member States more willing to amend their 
legislations than the necessity to obey regulations issued by the Community 
institutions. These ‘decentralising tendencies’ of soft law practice, which can be 
described as a kind of ‘pluralist self-regulation’,(86) encourage harmonisation of 
national policies without direct influence by the EU bodies.  
This process is captured by the theory of reflexive harmonisation. It suggests 
combining external regulations with self-regulation. The idea is borrowed from 
reflexive law, which aims at finding a golden means to coordinate diverse legislation. 
The optimal way is believed to be a compromise between ‘instrumentalist theories of 
regulation’, which impose concrete outcomes, and ‘deregulatory theories’ arguing for 
removal of all external control. According to the reflexive approach, the most effective 
regulatory interventions are those that seek to obtain their goals indirectly instead of 
providing the direct prescription. Thus, the goal of reflexive harmonisation is to 
encourage autonomous process of adjustment by supporting mechanisms of group 
representation and participation. The focus is laid not only on the input of national 
authorities, but also local governments and social actors. Based on these assumptions, 
reflexive harmonisation aims at preserving a space for experimentation in the rule-
making on the national level and promotes “regulatory learning through the exchange 
of information between different jurisdiction levels”. In other words, harmonisation 
should not serve as a way to replace state-level regulations, but should leave some 
autonomy to the MS allowing them to figure out their own solutions to regulatory 
problems, which should obviously be consistent with common goals.  
Reflexive harmonisation provides conditions for a process of discovery and/or 
adaptation that are thought to be more effective than establishing ‘optimal states’ to be 
achieved, especially given that ‘optimal solutions’ are often very difficult to identify. 
The experimentalist approach puts a great emphasis on comparison and learning from 
the action of others. Rule-making powers are devolved to self-regulation processes, as 
the MS are believed to be able to choose the most appropriate means to adjust their 
legal systems to EC law. Reflexive harmonisation is seen as an up-to-date regulatory 
technique, as it combines benefits of centralization together with local autonomy, and 
involves a wide range of actors, which is especially important in the case of 
enforcement.  
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Reflexive harmonisation responds to the need to coordinate national policies, while 
respecting their diversity. As such it is an appropriate theory for the changes in 
national citizenship laws. The discussions of these in the next section can be 
interpreted as example of reflexive harmonisation in the citizenship sphere.  
3. Relation between Union citizenship and Member State 
nationality policies   
3.1. In(ter)dependence of MS nationality legislations  
3.1.1. Legal provisions guaranteeing independence  
Union citizenship is conditional upon nationality of a Member State. Article 17 EC 
provides that “every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a 
citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace 
national citizenship”. Further, according to EU law, it is the Member States who have 
the exclusive freedom to decide who can acquire the status of national citizen. This is 
made clear by the “Declaration on Nationality of a Member State” attached by the 
Treaty of Maastricht to the EC Treaty:  
Whenever in the Treaty establishing the European Community reference is 
made to nationals of the Member States, the question whether an individual 
possesses the nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely by 
reference to the national law of the Member State concerned. Member 
States may declare, for information, who are to be considered their 
nationals for Community purposes by way of a declaration lodged with 
Presidency and may amend any such declarations whenever necessary. (87)  
By the monopoly in determining who qualifies as their nationals, the MS enjoy 
freedom in deciding who is going to be granted with the status of EU citizen.(88) In 
this sense, the MS are sovereign actors under international law; even if national 
legislations distinguish several categories of citizenship, the right to decide who is 
finally entitled to acquire Union citizenship lies in the hands of the Member States. 
This was confirmed by the Kaur case,(89) in which Ms Kaur born in Kenya, in a 
family of Asian origin, became a ‘Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies’ under 
the terms of The British Nationality Act 1948. After amending The British Nationality 
Act in 1981, she gained a status of a British Overseas Citizen, which does not entitle 
one to enter or reside within territory of the United Kingdom. Ms Kaur, as a ‘British 
Overseas Citizen’, claimed such a right under the Union citizenship provisions.(90) 
However, the Court rejected her arguments by referring to the Declaration, submitted 
by the UK upon its accession to the Community, that considers “only those UK 
citizens who are entitled to reside on the UK territory or having a specified connection 
with Gibraltar”(91) as nationals.  
3.1.2. Increasing interdependence between the MS   
For the purposes of the discourse presented in this chapter, it must be noted that 
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nationality policies are closely linked with the national immigration strategies. As 
Hansen and Weil observe, “throughout Europe the politics of immigration have 
become the politics of nationality.”(92) In this context, attempts to separate these two 
areas can not be successful in a long-term perspective. The EU, by its subsequent 
decisions concerning immigration and nationality (influenced by various, sometimes 
contradictory factors), prescribed competences in these two fields to different levels of 
governance, namely the latter remained in the MS discretion, while the former became 
(at least partly) coordinated at the supra- and intergovernmental level. The formal 
process of cooperation on common immigration procedures was launched by the 
Schengen Agreement in 1985.(93) Agreement on removing internal borders and 
strengthening external frontier controls was aimed at increasing security within the 
European Community.(94) The further step was made in Maastricht, where 
immigration and asylum were included into the third pillar of the EU(95). However, in 
Amsterdam it was transferred into “the more integrated decision-making setting of the 
first pillar [to create] more options for common European policies on migration in the 
future.”(96) The Amsterdam Treaty also incorporated the Schengen Agreement into 
the EC legislation, which (although not signed by all EU MS) showed that the 
regulations on immigration at the EU level were directed towards all EU citizens.  
Coordination of immigration policies poses a challenge for nationality laws, which 
belong to “the hard core of the identity and independence of the States”(97) and are 
still exclusive MS competences. Even establishment of Union citizenship, which 
obviously bound all the MS nationals together, did not entail any official cooperation 
in this field.  
In fact, subordination of immigration policy to the EU level strengthened the will of 
the MS to retain independence in the field of granting nationality. This cause and 
effect relationship can be explained best through the example of the countries 
traditionally open to migrants, which do not want to make a 180-degree turn in their 
way of treating newcomers.(98) For these states adjusting their legislations to strict 
visa requirements for third country citizens, imposed by the Schengen Agreement, is 
often against the general assumptions of their national strategies.(99) Therefore, trying 
to keep their course of actions consistent, they tend to facilitate access to national 
citizenship as a compensation for implemented restrictions concerning conditions of 
entry. To put it in more general terms, external obligations to limit immigration may 
lead to expanding nationality internally. In this sense, Spain provides an interesting 
study, in which all the regulations referring to immigrants are an outcome of the 
policy “driven by European harmonisation on the one hand, and local and national 
factors on the other.”(100)  
However, very diverse nationality laws resulted in clashing views of the status of 
citizen and of the common immigration policy. Despite MS apprehension, a need for 
harmonisation has emerged.(101) In this situation, the only solution seems to be the 
voluntary reduction of the discrepancies between nationality regulations, which in fact 
is taking place. As Ryan pointed out, “the convergence of apparently polar cases […] 
is revealing.”(102) The current EU trend shows that states with strict nationality laws 
are relaxing their rules to facilitate including permanent non-national residents, while 
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states whose nationality law is more open to migrants are tending to make it more 
restrictive.(103) It will be argued that these changes, although introduced through 
independent democratic processes of the particular MS, result from the pressure 
exerted by their co-members.  
Although introducing Union citizenship formally left nationality policies untouched, it 
definitely contributed to their interdependence.  
Once it is acknowledged that each Member State may autonomously fix the 
prerequisites, conditions, ways and means to acquire, forfeit and re-acquire 
their nationality, one must admit, however, that national regulations are 
often interdependent and linked one to another.(104)  
Granting national citizenship no longer concerns only one country, but also affects 
other members of the Community. Acquiring nationality of one Member State 
automatically entails adopting Union citizenship, and thus the right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the whole EU. This liberty deserves special attention, as it 
entails numerous controversies, for instance, in the case of European (both present and 
former) colonies.  
Countries possessing overseas territories are entitled to grant their subjects with 
nationality, and thus Union citizenship. This means that ascribing a resident of any 
colony with national citizenship of one MS gives them the right to enter every country 
belonging to the Community. For instance citizens of Canary Islands, Madeira, and 
the Azores (being Portuguese citizens), or inhabitants of Guyana, Martinique, 
Reunion, and Guadeloupe (holding French passports) can live and work in any MS 
exercising the freedom of movement inherent into Union citizenship. Moreover, 
countries, which do not grant their citizenship to inhabitants of their overseas 
territories, enjoy full freedom to confer them this status whenever they wish.  
Another example is that of Spain, which concluded an agreement on dual nationality 
with some South American countries.(105) Even if nationality of the Member State is 
the second one, it must be recognised by all the EU states regardless of their national 
rules. This was confirmed by the ruling of the European Court of Justice in the 
Micheletti case.(106) Although the case was decided before the establishment of 
Union citizenship, it illustrates very well the issue of dual nationality, at that time 
confined to workers, now applicable to all citizens. Mr Micheletti, who held two 
nationalities: Italian and Argentinean, lived in Argentina. After coming to Spain he 
was denied the rights ascribed to the nationals of the Community because Spanish 
law, in regards to dual nationality, takes into consideration the one of the country of 
residence. The Court decided that everyone possessing Member State nationality, even 
if he is at the same time a national of a non-member state, must be allowed to enjoy all 
the liberties inherent in the quality of Member State nationality. This judgement, from 
1990, now can be interpreted as the entitlement of all individuals holding nationality 
of any Member State to acquire Union citizenship and benefit from all the rights 
included in it.  
These examples show that decisions concerning nationality no longer have exclusively 
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domestic meaning. On the contrary, they influence other countries by forcing them to 
accept new EU citizens. The growing number of EU citizenship holders affects mostly 
the countries which are the traditional destinations of immigration. Therefore, it may 
be argued that “a certain amount of harmonisation should be envisaged in the area of 
nationality legislation”(107) In fact some MS express the belief that there should be 
some limitations in conferring nationality to third country residents, because they are 
afraid that such decisions may be taken regardless of the consequences for other EU 
countries. Also the Court, through the Micheletti case,(108) indicated that the 
regulation of citizenship laws should be in line with Community interests. It is 
emphasised by the statement that “Under international law, it is for each Member 
State, having due regard to Community law, to lay down the conditions for the 
acquisition and loss of nationality”,(109) which suggests that the Member States 
should take EU law into consideration. This reference is not clear, as there are no 
explicit legal provisions on the coordination of national citizenship policies at the EU 
level. Besides, the intention itself can be described as confusing or even as 
contradictory to the Declaration appended to the Maastricht Treaty by the Member 
States.(110)  
Recently, significant changes in national citizenship legislations of some EU Member 
States could have been observed. Were these new rules introduced exclusively 
because of the needs of a particular country? Or perhaps they were initiated due to (or 
maybe against) the pressure from other MS. The Irish, German, and Spanish cases 
seem particularly worth analysing. While the first two represent adjustment to other 
MS demands (they follow the above-mentioned EU trends), the latter shows the 
opposite reaction to the European pressures.  
3.2. Spanish case  
3.2.1. Spanish attitude towards migrants  
Immigration policy in Spain has been always shaped with more latitude than in any 
other EC country. Dealing with serious economic problems it provided more 
emigrants than attracted immigrants. Numerous incomers from Northern Africa and 
Latin America treated Spain (before it joined the EU) as a temporary place of 
residence before final move to northern European countries, which were perceived as 
much better off and therefore more attractive as an immigration destination.(111) Only 
in the mid 1980s, due to a sudden economic growth, which coincided with entry into 
the European Community, did Spain start to experience substantial immigration – it 
very quickly transformed from a ’labour exporter’ to ‘labour importer’.(112) The 
newcomers, however, “have not over-whelmed social services, nor have they 
increased unemployment appreciably by competing against native-born Spaniards for 
desirable, formal-sector jobs”. (113) An absence of significant fear of massive 
migration, which bothered most of the EU countries, meant Spain would probably not 
have tightened visa control if not influenced by other MS, especially the Schengen 
requirements. Under the pressure of the EC it abandoned its traditional policy of 
allowing entry by citizens of the Maghreb(114) and most Latin American countries
(115) without visas in 1991 and 1992 respectively.(116) Especially imposing visa 
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requirements on the latter was considered as a politically sensitive step, “contrary to 
the policy followed by every Spanish government from Franco to the present Socialist 
Government”.(117) For years many Latin American countries had dual-nationality 
agreements with Spain, which enabled their citizens to move to Spain and be 
recognised there as nationals (as Spain in case of dual nationality recognises the one of
place of residence). Special ties are undoubtedly based on the shared language and 
culture.(118) Interestingly, the results of many national surveys on integration of 
various nationalities into the Spanish society show the highest acceptance for 
integration of Latin Americans.(119)  
Nevertheless, Spain, as one of the countries responsible for controlling an external EU 
border, had to adjust its policy to the common interest. “Spanish officials anticipate[d] 
continuing pressure from other members of the European Community as well as the 
Schengen Group”,(120) which led to the establishment of stricter entry conditions 
even for Latin Americans.  
3.2.2. Implications of 2005 amnesty for illegal immigrants   
Despite the imposed restrictions, Spanish immigration policy is still characterised by 
laxity in comparison with other MS. The most recent evidence of its tolerance is the 
amnesty for illegal immigrants working in Spain, which was launched on 7th February 
2005 and lasted for three months.(121) Everyone who possessed an identity card, was 
able to prove that they lived in Spain before August, had a job contract for next six 
moths, and had no criminal record, was eligible to apply for a permanent residence 
permit.(122) The government expected to receive around 1,025,000 applications from 
around the world,(123) and predicted that 800 000 immigrants might qualify.(124) 
Finally 700 000 illegal immigrants were granted legal status.(125)  
The whole action provoked very negative reactions in the EU. The immediate 
response of France showed that Spanish policy was unacceptable for some of the MS. 
The French government has banned the beneficiaries of the amnesty from working in 
France.(126) Many of those people who were granted the right to stay in Spain were 
believed to be illegal immigrants from France, but also from Germany and Italy. 
Apparently, they hoped that this would enable them to go back to these countries, 
where they would finally have a right to work. However, as the French government 
emphasized, a non-EU citizen who has gained residence status in a particular EU 
country would not in most cases be able to work in another EU country. The 
entitlement to move and reside freely refers only to those who managed to obtain 
nationality of one of the MS, and therefore Union citizenship.  
This brings us to the most interesting point of the significance of the Spanish amnesty 
in the view EU citizenship. Taking into consideration the fact that most of the 
immigrants, who benefited from the amnesty were from Equator and Columbia (along 
with Romanians and Moroccans),(127) and the lenient conditions for conferring the 
status of national citizen to a “national of Ibero-America, Andorra, the Philippines, 
Equatorial Guinea, or a Sephardic Jew”,(128) it may be argued to be a first step 
towards granting Community citizenship. Assigning them with the right to reside 
gives them the possibility to acquire Spanish nationality after only two years.(129)
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This is of course tantamount to gaining the status of EU citizen with all the liberties 
included in it. In this case, obviously the right to move and reside freely is of the 
biggest concerns, as it opens the way to all the EU countries. Providing that the above-
mentioned scenario takes place, in 2007 France will have to recognise all the 
immigrants who benefited from the Spanish amnesty (and due to their roots acquired 
Spanish citizenship within two years) as EU citizens. Even those who used to work 
illegally in France, but managed to get to Spain and fulfilled all the necessary 
conditions (first for obtaining resident status, and then Spanish nationality), will have 
a full right to come back to France and exercise all the liberties inherent in Union 
citizenship. To put it in more general terms, the establishment of EU citizenship 
entails “stronger commonality and reciprocity of rights in different member states”.
(130)  
3.2.3. Conclusions   
As a result of its lenient immigration and nationality policy Spain is perceived as a 
“backdoor to citizenship in the European Community”.(131) In fact this example 
illustrates an EU-wide impact of decisions upon nationality and immigration of the 
particular MS. Union citizenship, particularly via freedom of movement, links all MS 
into an ‘interactive organism’.(132) In this context, Spain is accused of ignoring the 
situation in other European countries. It may also have been exploiting the fact that it 
no longer bears the full cost or impact of its decisions in this area, as many ‘new’ 
citizens or lawful residents move to other MS.  
3.3. Irish case   
Ireland is another country with liberal nationality legislation, but, contrary to Spain, it 
is responding to the EU trends of converging MS policies in this field. Although the 
impact of Community Membership on the reform of Irish citizenship law may not be 
widely recognised, it will be argued that there are evident signals of indirect influence 
on it.  
3.3.1. Essence of former Irish nationality law  
Until 2005, Ireland was the only country in the EU to grant citizenship automatically 
at the moment of birth to all those born on its territory, or even on the territory of the 
Northern Ireland, formally part of the United Kingdom, but part of the physical island 
of Ireland. The principle of unconditional ius soli was central to nationality law from 
1922, when the Irish state came into being.(133) According to the Irish Nationality 
and Citizenship Act from 1935, “all those born in the Irish Free State on or after 1922 
were classed as ‘natural-born citizens’.”(134) This right was extended to those born in 
Northern Ireland through the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act in 1956.(135) The 
birthright citizenship, applied for 83 years, reflected an inclusive territorial conception 
of the Irish people (admittedly balanced by elements of ius sanguinis also present in 
Irish nationality law), which did not dictate their status by who their parents were, but 
treated all children equal at birth. As a result of the 1998 referendum on Northern 
Ireland this became a constitutional right. The Irish government then elaborated the 
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rule in the Nationality and Citizenship Act 2001.(136)  
As concerns naturalisation, conditions of acquiring Irish citizenship in this way have 
been also very lenient in comparison with other EU countries. After implementing the 
Maastricht Treaty only 5 years of residence qualified for naturalisation in Ireland 
compared to 6 years in Portugal, 7 in Denmark, 10 in Italy and 15 in Germany.(137) 
Despite some changes in the required time of residence, Ireland remained one of the 
most ‘open to immigrant’ countries. Even British and Dutch nationality legislations, 
which also demanded 5 years residence, posed stricter conditions in other aspects of 
qualifying for national citizenship, such as giving up the first nationality (in case of 
the Netherlands), or at least intention to have the principal residence in the host 
country (in case of the United Kingdom).(138) Only in Spain has adopting national 
citizenship been easier.(139)  
3.3.2. Controversies around unconditional ius soli  
Before joining the EU, Ireland was definitely more an emigrant than immigrant state; 
hence, its immigrant-friendly policy did not result in any significant inflows of 
newcomers. However, entering the Community in 1985, which was followed by 
almost immediate boost in the Irish economy (The 1990s were called the ‘Celtic 
Tiger’ era of rapid growth) attracted a large number of job-seekers, also from non-EU 
countries. The increasing number of third country nationals, who could quite easily 
obtain Irish citizenship for themselves and automatically for their children born in 
Ireland, entailed some controversies. Birthright citizenship was especially criticised, 
because, as some argued, it was excessively abused. The most controversial 
consequence of the unconditional ius soli principle was the fact that the families of 
children born in Ireland, and therefore Irish citizens, could “make a legal claim to 
remain in the state on the basis of their connection to an Irish citizen.”(140) That line 
of argumentation was really strong in the context of Ireland – a country particularly 
involved in providing pro-family law. The Irish constitution in Article 41 recognises 
“the family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of Society and as a 
moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and 
superior to all positive law.”(141) Thus, in most cases families of Irish citizen children 
were allowed to stay in the country.(142) In 2002, for instance, more than 4,000 non-
EU immigrants were granted residency because they were parents of babies born in 
Ireland.(143) However, in January 2003 the Irish Supreme Court ruled that parents of 
Irish-born children did not enjoy an automatic right to residence. This partially 
undermined the citizenship of the child, whose residence possibilities are clearly 
linked to those of his parents, and can be seen as the beginning of the dissolution of 
ius soli.(144)  
Nevertheless, Ireland remained relatively liberal regarding nationality, and this lenient 
citizenship policy is perceived to have been a cause of a ‘foreign baby boom’; in the 
beginning of the twenty first century the number of babies born to non-nationals sky-
rocketed from 2% in 1999 to almost 20% in 2004.(145) Significantly, 70% of the non-
Irish mothers came from sub-Saharan Africa. They were thought to travel to Dublin 
expressly to give birth, putting their health at risk in order to obtain Irish citizenship 
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for their babies.(146) Some women arrived heavily pregnant - sometimes in their last 
week - gave birth and then immediately claimed asylum.(147) Hence, the Irish Prime 
Minister Bertie Ahern stated that the birthright citizenship was being ‘rampantly 
abused’, with 60% of all asylum seekers being pregnant when they made their 
applications.(148) Therefore, he saw a need for reform of the Irish nationality law. As 
the ius soli rule was enshrined in the Irish constitution, change of nationality law 
required amendment in the constitution, which in turn could have been done only 
through a referendum.(149)  
The possibility of the constitutional referendum to remove unconditional ius soli was 
considered by the Irish Government already in 2001 (interestingly it became public 
knowledge only during the 2004 referendum campaign).(150) Then the issue was 
brought up by the Fiana Fail-Progressive Democrat coalition, which claimed that they 
would “keep under review the number of applications from non-nationals to remain in 
the State on the basis of parentage of an Irish born child”.(151) The coalition 
considered introducing a clause to the constitution forbidding conferring the right of 
residence to these parents, but finally did not realise the idea.  
3.3.3. Proposal for a constitutional amendment – debate on the need of the 
nationality reform  
It was in March 2004, when the government announced the proposal to restrict the 
grant of Irish citizenship to non-national children born in Ireland. The amendment 
suggested inserting into Article 9 of the Constitution the following sections:  
1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, a person born in the 
island of Ireland, which includes its islands and its seas, who does not have, at 
the time of his or her birth, at least one parent who is an Irish citizen or entitled 
to be an Irish citizen is not entitled to Irish citizenship or nationality, unless 
otherwise provided for by law.  
2. This section shall not apply to persons born before the date of the enactment of 
this section.(152)  
The debate before the referendum, planned for June 2004, was very active, raising 
issues connected with domestic problems caused by the high number of births to non-
national mothers, the Irish national heritage as well as adjusting to laws of other MS.  
One of the main government’s arguments was above-mentioned high birth-rate to the 
non-national parents and numerous problems posed by non-nationals giving birth in 
the Dublin Maternity hospital.(153) As the Minister for Justice, Michael McDowell 
put it:  
Our maternity services come under pressure because they have to deal at 
short notice with women who may have communications difficulties, about 
whom no previous history of pregnancy or of mother’s health is known […]
(154)  
While the claim that the numbers were significant enough to present any such threat 
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was disputed, and it was suggested that Irish women also often presented late in 
pregnancy at hospitals,(155) the view that there was a problem took hold, and 
explanations of what seemed high numbers of children acquiring Irish citizenship, 
usually followed by granting this status also to their parents, did not reassure other EU 
countries. As it was already mentioned, after introducing Union citizenship, all MS’ 
nationality policies became highly interdependent. Therefore, they started to pay 
attention to particular citizenship legislations. Ireland, with its lenient policy, was 
especially observed by the countries with strict nationality and migration laws, 
protecting carefully their borders from significant inflows of non-EU nationals. But 
Union citizenship, in a way, limited the effects of their efforts, as third country 
citizens can gain access to their countries, exercising the right to free movement 
inherent in EU citizenship, which can be acquired by adopting nationality of any MS. 
In this context, easiness to obtain Irish citizenship caused apprehension among other 
EU states.  
These worries were reinforced by the ECJ’s ruling in Chen case. Catherine Zhu, a 
Chinese child, was born in Northern Ireland, formally part of the UK, but falling 
within the territorial scope of the Irish nationality laws, because part of the island of 
Ireland. As a result she automatically became an Irish national. Her mother wanted to 
stay in the UK, relying on her daughter’s status as a migrant EU citizen (an Irish 
citizen in the UK). EU law gives all EU citizens the right to reside in all other MS. 
The UK attempted to deny both mother and baby residence rights, and the case came 
before the Court of Justice. The Court’s decision was as follows:  
In circumstances like those of the main proceedings, Article 18 EC and Council 
Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence confer on a young 
minor who is a national of a Member State, is covered by appropriate sickness 
insurance and is in the care of a parent who is a third-country national having 
sufficient resources for that minor not to become a burden on the public finances of 
the host Member State, a right to reside for an indefinite period in that State. In such 
circumstances, those same provisions allow a parent who is that minor's primary carer 
to reside with the child in the host Member State.(156)  
This judgement meant that a child born on Irish soil acquires an EU-wide right of 
residence for itself and its primary carer, even if the carer does not have EU 
citizenship. Normally this right only applies outside Ireland, since an Irish citizen 
within Ireland falls outside the scope of EU law. However, in recent years the ECJ has 
extended the rights of citizens and their families to the situation where they return 
home after a period abroad.(157) Thus Catherine Zhu might be able to take her mother 
to live with her in Ireland, even though domestic Irish law would not automatically 
grant the non-European parent residence rights. Therefore, Ireland, by granting 
nationality to the children born on its territory, is moving towards an obligation to 
allow their parents long-term residence, which, in turn, makes acquiring citizenship 
easier, as people with ‘Irish associations’ are usually considered for naturalisation 
after 3 years (instead of 5) of legal residence in the state.(158) This fact results from 
the right ascribed to the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, namely the 
power to waive one or more of the conditions for naturalisation in certain 
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circumstances, for instance due to ‘Irish associations’.(159)  
The Irish government realised that its unconditional ius soli principle in the view of 
the above-mentioned Court’s decision made access to EU citizenship even easier. It 
admitted that this situation could be abused by people coming to Ireland solely to 
obtain Irish citizenship for their children, which would give them the whole EU. This 
in turn could “cause difficulties in Ireland’s relations with other member states.”(160) 
Hence, the transformation of nationality law was proposed.  
Nevertheless, the opponents of the suggested amendment denied the need to change 
their citizenship legislation due to the EU membership. They emphasised that there 
had never been a formal request from Europe, or any pressure to alter their nationality 
law.(161) While the former is definitely true, the latter is disputable. Indeed, according
to Community law, citizenship legislations are the sole preserve of the Member States,
(162) and the status of EU membership can not be treated officially as a factor 
determining basis for Irish citizenship. However, informal pressures exist, and MS 
aware of their political interdependence on neighbouring states, and not wishing to 
alienate them and incur possible future ‘revenge’ costs, may choose to voluntarily 
align their policies with current EU trends. The Irish case can be viewed as an 
example of this.  
Another controversial point about the proposed amendment was the impact on the 
integration of non-nationals into the Irish society. The government was convinced that 
the ‘integrity’ of Irish citizenship would be preserved, while its abuse would be 
prevented.(163) As the ministers argued, not the excessive number of immigrants was 
worrisome, but the fact that the constitutional provisions were used in another way 
that they intended.(164) This argument was attacked by the opposition. First of all, the 
attention was drawn to the fact that the proposed amendment was aimed at children – 
they were the ones deprived of adopting nationality at birth, not at their parents, whose 
right to residency or citizenship was not altered.(165) The proposal meant classifying 
children according to their parents’ status, which would violate the principle (deeply 
rooted in Irish law) that all children are born equal and should be cherished equally.
(166) But the truth is that limiting the number of children entitled to Irish citizenship 
reduced the number of third country citizens applying for Irish nationality, as the 
process of naturalisation lasts longer when no ‘association’ to an Irish citizen can be 
shown.(167)  
Moreover, the government was accused of undermining the integrity of the 
constitution itself, as the proposed amendment entailed the creation of a new 
distinction, namely between members of the Irish nation and Irish citizen nationals.
(168) This is undoubtedly confusing, but necessary, as Article 2 of the Irish 
Constitution, saying that everyone has a birthright to be part of the nation, would still 
guarantee all children born in Ireland to be members of the Irish nation. Yet according 
to the amendment, the children, whose parents are not Irish, would not acquire 
citizenship or nationality automatically. Their parents would be required to prove their 
genuine link to Ireland. This might be established by being a legal resident in Ireland 
for three out of the previous four years immediately before the birth of the child.(169)
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In other words, introducing the Article 9.2.1 may be described as devaluing the Irish 
Constitution by making Article 2 meaningless, as the membership of the nation 
became, in practice, a completely empty notion, since no longer attached to 
nationality.(170) This requirement of connection with Ireland was indicated as an 
example of inconsistency, given the possibility of adopting nationality through descent 
for at least two generations.(171) In fact, third generation Irish descendants from 
various places all over the world have claimed their Irish citizenship, which enabled 
them to travel and work in the whole EU, even though they did not have any personal 
connection with Ireland.(172) This, however, did not worry other MS so much, as 
their citizenship legislations are mostly based on the ius sanguinis principle. So, for 
them it is natural that even third-generation descendants, usually with no connection to 
the country of origin, will still possess their passports.  
Another issue, which divided the proponents and the adversaries of the proposed 
amendment was the meaning of the reform for Ireland and the Irish people. The 
government claimed it was simply closing a loophole, preventing the abuse of 
birthright citizenship.(173) This argument could not be accepted by the opposition - 
the proposed reform could not be treated as a technical amendment. On the contrary, it 
was to completely reverse the traditional, republican basis on which citizenship of the 
country had been bestowed since the foundation of the state.(174) The opposition 
questioned the need for this change, particularly in the light of the 2000 Supreme 
Court ruling that “the constitution should be blind to pedigree”, while the analysed 
constitutional amendment would move the bloodline criterion to centrality as the basis 
of granting Irish nationality.(175) The adversaries of the reform also strongly 
criticised the rush to implement it.(176) They argued that changing the constitution, 
by removing the basis on which Ireland had granted citizenship since 1922, entailed 
deep implications for the Irish heritage and identity. Therefore, it should not be done 
in a hurry, especially that there was no emergency to justify the haste. Such a 
fundamental reform deserved a thorough process of consultation and discussion on the 
whole subject, not an immediate call for the referendum.(177)  
Finally, the constitutional amendment was approved on June,11 2004 through a 
referendum, by an overwhelming majority (79% to 21%)(178). This fact was quite 
surprising in the light of the 1998 referendum, where the Irish people, also by a vast 
majority, voted for the inclusion of unconditional ius soli into the Irish Constitution.
(179) Only six years later they invalidated their own decision. Accepting the 
constitutional amendment was followed by adopting the new ‘Irish Nationality and 
Citizenship Act 2004’, which confirmed that the children born of non-national parents, 
on or after the 1 January 2005, would no longer acquire Irish nationality 
automatically.(180)  
3.4. German case  
Germany has always been characterised by very restrictive nationality laws. Despite 
being a common immigration destination, it has applied an exclusive policy, based on 
an ethno-cultural model,(181) for most of the twentieth century. However, the recent 
liberalisation of certain conditions under which German citizenship can be acquired, 
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shows Germany adjusting to the European mainstream.(182) It will be argued that this 
reform was underpinned by the deteriorating relative position of long-term third 
country nationals after the creation of Union citizenship.  
3.4.1. Impact of EU citizenship on third country nationals  
The effect which introducing Union citizenship had on the situation of third country 
nationals can be best explained through the example of Germany, where immigrants 
constitute 10% of the population of which 75% come from non-EU countries,(183) 
and for whom access to German nationality (and therefore EU citizenship) was at that 
time the most difficult among all the MS. Union citizenship with all its entitlements 
increased the discrepancies between MS nationals and non-EU citizens. As O’Leary 
and Tiilikainen put it “the distinction between citizens of the Union and third country 
nationals has become sharper […] since Union citizenship has acquired the form of a 
discriminating landmark for the purpose of difference in treatment”.(184) Indeed, 
European citizenship, which was designed to foster the integration process, definitely 
undermined the status of non-EU citizens within the Community.(185) This became 
particularly visible between EU- and non-EU migrants residing in one of the MS. 
Every new privilege enshrined in EU citizenship (one must bear in mind it is a 
dynamic concept)(186) puts non-EU migrants in a worse position.(187) The negative 
impact of European citizenship on third country residents was neglected while 
creating the notion of EU citizenship.(188) This weakness of Community citizenship 
drew attention to the access of non-EU nationals to citizenships of particular MS. If 
Community citizenship was reserved only for EU nationals, then for the purpose of 
the real integrity of the EU societies, relative ease of acquisition of national citizenship 
by long-term residents became important. As Hansen and Weil noted, “states are 
generally unwilling to tolerate, generation after generation, large numbers of non-
citizens without an entitlement to citizenship.”(189)  
In this context, strict German nationality law obviously came under criticism, in 
particular with reference to the position of long-term residents from third countries. 
Attention was drawn to the fact that they contributed to the welfare of the Community, 
and therefore should enjoy the same liberties as EU citizens.(190) Especially, the right 
to participate in political life was stressed, as this makes an individual a real 
participant in the polity.(191)  
Full inclusion becomes particularly important in the case of second- and third-
generation immigrants, when “individuals are raised in the society and subject to 
socialising influences of language, school, peers, and so on.”(192) In Germany 
millions of Turks, who lived there for two or three generations, were denied the right 
to become German citizens. Maintaining the status of these immigrants as ‘foreigners’
and refusing them citizenship seemed to be unjust. “The prospect of a self-
perpetuating minority forever closed out of majority society” can be perceived as a 
threat to the future relationship between these groups. A lack of attempts to improve 
their position as long-term residents (e.g. by conferring full civil and social rights) will 
result in their exclusion from full membership in society. John states that “the quest 
for ‘special group status’ for foreigners was ‘socially divisive’.(193) Instead of 
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creating separate groups and ascribing them with certain privileges, efforts should be 
directed towards facilitating acquisition of German citizenship with all the liberties 
and responsibilities it entails.  
3.4.2. Essence of former nationality law in Germany   
Where does this reserved attitude towards immigrants in Germany stem from? The 
restrictive nationality law dates back to 1913, when it was introduced for the first time 
at the national level.(194) As Lemke phrased it, “the reality of the imperial state 
outflanked the republican notion of citizenship.”(195) At that time, the main goal of 
citizenship legislation was to include all Germans living abroad and exclude the 
increasing number of immigrants.(196) Hence, the German notion of citizenship was 
based on the principle ius sanguinis. This law remained in force until 1999. The 
Naturalisation Rules, introduced in 1977, which prescribed absolute state discretion in 
naturalising foreigners,(197) only confirmed unwillingness of the German state to 
ascribe even permanent residents with German citizenship. The provisions that “the 
granting of German citizenship can be only considered if there is a public interest in 
[it]” and “in the German legal system resident aliens enjoy far-reaching rights and 
liberties anyway”,(198) which resulted in the lowest naturalisation rate in Europe,
(199) explain the German position in this matter.  
Only after the collapse of communism and unification of German state, did a more 
liberal reform movement emerge.(200) The unsuccessful attempts to integrate millions 
of immigrants, by preserving their ‘alien’ status, finally led to a different discourse on 
citizenship and migration.(201) The need for more liberal concept of citizenship was 
widely recognised. The quest for transforming nationality law was also stipulated by 
introducing EU citizenship,(202) which entailed mutual comparison of citizenship 
legislations. Although they remained in the MS’ discretion, Germany received evident 
signals that it should liberate its restrictive policy. The pressures urging Germany to 
‘modernise’ their nationality legislation was the result of the natural need to harmonise
these laws. In response, the German government in 1998 admitted that too many 
German inhabitants were not entitled to German citizenship, and started to prepare a 
‘substantial reform’.(203)  
3.4.3. Implications of the 1999 citizenship reform  
After several years of controversy and debate, a new law on citizenship was finally 
introduced on January 1, 2000. The most significant changes included departure from 
relying solely on the ius sanguinis principle and softening conditions for 
naturalisation.  
As concerns children of foreign nationals born in Germany, they gained the right to 
acquire German citizenship automatically at birth under certain restrictions. First, at 
least one parent must have resided lawfully in Germany for at least eight years. 
Secondly, that parent must have possessed an unlimited residence permit or special 
residence permission for at least three years prior to the child’s birth. These provisions 
applied to the children born after December 31, 1999, but special rules for the children 
born in the 1990s were provided in a transition agreement, allowing the granting of 
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citizenship to them if application was submitted before December 31, 1999.  
This is obviously a remarkable step towards facilitating access to German citizenship 
– to illustrate its significance it is enough to mention that for over a million Turkish 
immigrants the door to German nationality stood open. One must bear in mind, 
however, that the requirements concerning the residence permit at the moment of 
introducing the new law could not be fulfilled by a half of the Turkish immigrants. 
The limited effects of new law, which undoubtedly improved the position of long-term 
residents, indicate the need for the future changes to ensure the full integration of 
German society. This, however, requires acceptance of ethnic and cultural plurality as 
a civil political norm,(204) which seems still to be a problem for many Germans.  
Importantly, the children, who benefit from the ius soli principle, simultaneously 
acquiring nationality of their parents, between 18 and 23 have to opt for one of their 
nationalities, as the principle of avoiding dual nationality is still applicable. Although 
general acceptance of dual citizenship was envisaged in the first draft of the new 
legislation, it was refused by the CDU/CSU coalition, which gained advantage over 
the SPD at the stage of approving it in the parliamentary institutions. Holding two 
nationalities is possible only as an exception. Although the scope of exemptions was 
moderately extended, plural nationality is still not a legal right. As the possibility to 
hold dual nationality has beneficial effects on naturalization and integration process, 
its prohibition “raises the strongest doubts over the capability of the new provisions to 
effectively depart from the ethno-cultural notion of citizenship.”(205)  
Turning to naturalization, an obligatory resident period was reduced from fifteen to 
eight years, again under certain conditions. One of them refers to the necessity of 
renunciation of other nationalities (analogically to the ius soli requirement described 
above). Other prerequisites are, for instance, the sufficient knowledge of German 
language and acceptance of free democratic basic order laid down by the German 
Constitution. Although the term ‘sufficient’ may be disapproved due to its ambiguity, 
and in many cases it turned out to be the main obstacle in obtaining citizenship, the 
demand to possess a communicative command of German, in terms of integrating 
foreigners into the German society, can not be criticised. Similarly, loyalty to the 
constitution of the country where one aspires to become a citizen can not raise any 
objections. What is also worth mentioning is that the new law reduced fees for 
naturalization and made the whole procedure easier.(206) Also the conditions for the 
spouses of German citizens were relaxed – the (foreign) spouse must have lived in 
Germany for at least three years (instead of five), and the couple must have been 
married for at least two years (instead of three). Moreover, in special cases, even 
people who have lived in Germany for a shorter period than eight years may try to 
obtain German citizenship on a discretionary basis. Significantly, when the new 
legislation came into force, in some towns the number of applications for 
naturalization doubled or even tripled,(207) leading to an average raise of 
naturalization rate of almost 30%.(208) Interestingly, in nearly every second case new 
German citizens were allowed to retain nationality of their country of origin.(209)  
The new naturalization rules still place Germany among the countries relatively closed 
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to immigrants. Strong national voices to protect German society from including high 
numbers of third country nationals reveal an attachment to the ethno-cultural model of 
citizenship. However, adopting the new law should be viewed as a remarkable step to 
liberalization resulting from following the EU trends. As the German government puts 
it, a large group within Germany’s population “now has the opportunity to participate 
in and help shape social and political issues with all inherent rights and 
obligations.”(210) They describe the reforms as “harmonisation with European 
standards”,(211) implying compliance with ‘unwritten’ requirements of the European 
Community.  
3.5. Directive on third country long-term residents   
As was shown in the previous chapters, formally independent national citizenship 
policies may be indirectly and unofficially affected by the other MS. This chapter 
draws attention to the fact that the EU institutions indirectly influence MS’ rules on 
obtaining national citizenship, using the example of the Council Directive on the 
status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents.(212)  
3.5.1. The Directive as a response to Union citizenship   
Union citizenship, aimed at facilitating migrants the integration, resulted in 
approximating the rights of MS nationals living in another EU country to the rights 
enjoyed by the citizens of the host country, whilst at the same time it deepened the 
gulf between all EU citizens and third country residents.(213) The institution of EU 
citizenship was widely criticised for undermining the status of non-EU migrants. 
Perchinig drew attention to its hierarchical character, which he perceives as the 
significant weakness.(214) This aspect was also brought up by Withol de Wenden, 
who described the situation after implementing Community citizenship as follows:  
At the centre we find the national of the State where he is living, then the 
Europeans whose rights are reciprocal with those given to foreigners in 
other European states, then the long term non-European residents, the non-
European non-residents, the refugees, and at the margins, the asylum 
seekers and the illegals.(215)  
This description faithfully rendered the real situation. At the same time, however, it 
raised controversies concerning such a state of matters. Was it unfair and therefore 
should the situation be improved by eliminating the discrepancies between inhabitants 
of the EU holding different status, or on the contrary, was it just and should be 
accepted? The opinions were divided – some countries believed that this situation 
required “a deep reconsideration of European policy on immigration”,(216) whilst 
others, especially those described as “old guest-workers states”,(217) expressed 
resolute opposition to harmonising this sphere at the EU level. The widest debate has 
been on the relation between MS citizens and third country long-term residents. 
Although this issue was at stake since the very beginning of the European 
Community,(218) the discussion flared up after the establishment of Union 
citizenship. The distinct cacophony between the EU members’ positions seemed to 
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prevent a compromise,(219) especially given that some of them were not even willing 
to take part in negotiations.  
The advocates of equalising the position of EU and non-EU citizens proclaimed the 
need for a legal act, which would grant third country nationals with the rights so far 
enjoyed exclusively by the MS nationals. This issue was raised during the Tampere 
Summit, where the Council stressed that the decisions on “the approximation of 
national legislation on the conditions for admission and residence of third country 
nationals [...]”(220) should be taken immediately. What is more, it endorsed the 
objective that “long-term legally resident third country nationals [should] be offered 
the opportunity to obtain the nationality of the Member State in which they are 
resident.”(221) That clearly implied the will to influence conferral of national 
citizenship, which is incompatible with provisions of the EC Treaty and the 
Declaration on Nationality. These decisions also indicate a strategic advantage gained 
by the proponents of harmonisation of immigration and nationality legislations. 
Despite the objections of some MS, the Commission managed to issue a 
Communication on Union immigration and integration policy in accordance with the 
attitudes which dominated the Tampere Summit.  
The Communication acknowledged the demographic need for immigration and 
proposed establishing common rules on admitting labour migrants on the territory of 
the EU.(222) Moreover, it proposed the approximation of their legal status with those 
of EU nationals by introducing the concept of civic citizenship.  
“The legal status granted to third country nationals would be based on the 
principle of providing sets of rights and responsibilities on a basis of 
equality with those of nationals but differentiated according to the length of 
stay while providing for progression to permanent status. In the longer term 
this could extend to offering a form of civic citizenship, based on the EC 
Treaty and inspired by the Charter of Fundamental Rights consisting of a 
set of rights and duties offered to third country nationals”(223)  
Notwithstanding the positive atmosphere of Tampere Summit, which resulted in the 
issuing the above-mentioned Communication, the Council failed to adopt any hard 
law acts. Several proposals for Council Directives on third country citizens published 
by the Commission between 1999 and 2001 were significantly watered down in the 
subsequent negotiations.(224) The directive on entry for employment was finally 
abandoned as the result of the strong opposition of Austria and Germany.(225) 
However, those regarding the status of long-term residents and the right to family 
reunification were finally approved in 2003, which means that the MS managed to 
agree that common immigration rules, at least to a certain extent, are necessary.  
3.5.2. Provisions of the Directive   
The Council directive on third-country nationals who are long-term residents aims at 
achieving a goal set during the Tampere Summit, namely approximating their status to 
that of MS nationals by granting them a set of uniform rights, which should be as 
close as possible to those designed to EU citizens.(226) In the situation of non-EU 
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immigrants it should contribute to their integration into host societies, which is 
indispensable in “promoting economic and social cohesion, a fundamental objective of 
the Community stated in the Treaty.”(227) The truth is that the position of non-EU 
long-term residents had varied enormously among the MS, which had been believed to 
have a negative impact on their political and social integration in Europe.(228) 
Importantly, harmonisation of the rules concerning acquisition of long-term resident 
status can not hinder the access to it, as the MS who apply more favourable conditions 
are allowed to retain them.(229)  
The main prerequisite for the status of long-term resident is the length of stay in a 
given MS – non-EU immigrants must “have resided legally and continuously within 
its [EU] territory for five years immediately prior to the submission of the relevant 
application.”(230) Another condition concerns the ‘adequate resources’, which allow 
to support oneself and their family as well as possessing the sickness insurance, which 
is hold by the citizens of the host MS.(231) Third country nationals wishing to acquire 
the status of long term residents must also prove that they do “not constitute a threat to 
public policy or public security.”(232) What is worth mentioning, the application can 
not be refused on economic grounds.(233) The Directive also contains detailed 
procedures for the assessment of the applications and issuing the long-term residence 
permits.(234) It also defines the cases in which the status might be withdrawn.(235)  
Attention should be drawn to the fact that the above conditions apply not only to the 
immigrant who is employed or self employed.(236) Parallel to Union citizenship, 
which recognised all MS nationals regardless of their economic status, the Directive 
refers to all migrants even if they do not exercise any economic activity.  
The rights accorded to the long-term residents ensure them equal treatment with the 
nationals of the particular EU country in a wide range of cases.(237) The most 
meaningful is freedom of movement within the whole European Community, which 
allows persons to settle in any MS. These entitlements are, as well as promoting social 
cohesion, believed to foster the ‘attainment of the internal market’ and stimulate 
desirable mobility on the Community’s employment market.(238)  
3.5.3. Implications of the Directive  
The Directive, as the whole process of harmonisation, has its advocates and 
adversaries. Approximating the position of third country residents to that of MS 
nationals is obviously supported by the proponents of the concept of Union citizenship 
based on the place of residence. Moreover, the countries which lead open immigrant 
policies also welcomed the decision of the EU, which improved the situation of non-
EU citizens in the countries with restrictive immigration laws. Ireland, for instance, 
recognizes the need for “a flexible system, balancing the interests and requirements of 
Member States on one hand and recognising and protecting the rights and interests of 
migrants.”(239) The Immigrant Council of Ireland (ICI) argues that all MS should 
admit that the EU has always been and will be a place of immigration,(240) and this 
fact should not be treated as a threat, but as the normal course of events. Recognising 
the inevitability of the considerable flows of immigrants in the forthcoming decades 
should automatically lead to considering the regularisation of those who already reside 
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in the EU as highly desirable.(241) The ICI supports the Commission’s opinion that 
coherent immigration policy and “synergies between immigration, integration and 
employment policies at all levels and across all disciplines”(242) are indispensable as 
far as the full integration of the EU societies is concerned.  
Although this line of argumentation is difficult to undermine, the fact of 
harmonisation of the rules concerning third-country nationals in all MS raises 
controversies. Some EU countries, especially those with strict immigration laws, are 
not willing to comply with common rules. Why do they object? Because they perceive 
the Directive as an attempt to violate their sovereignty in shaping national citizenship 
policies. The Directive indirectly interferes with the MS autonomy in establishing 
nationality legislations.  
First and foremost, the Directive introduces a set length of duration, which entitles 
non-EU citizens to the status of long-term residents. Before that, according a particular
status to immigrants fell completely under national authorities’ competence. In this 
aspect, the Directive has deprived the MS of the right to decide about the position of 
third country nationals. What is more, the obligation to recognise them as long-term 
residents after five years of residence indirectly influences decisions concerning 
national citizenship. In some MS access to national citizenship is contingent on a 
long-term residence permit. Foreigners who aspire to nationality e.g. in Germany, the 
Netherlands or the UK may be naturalised only if they possess a permanent residence 
permit.(243) However, even in the countries which do not require this document to 
grant national citizenship, it will undoubtedly strengthen the position of candidates for 
naturalisation. Holding a long-term residence permit signifies a 5-year stay in the 
given country, which facilitates proving a given period of duration indispensable for 
acquiring national citizenship. In other words, the chances of becoming a MS citizen 
increase with the fact of acquiring the status of long-term resident.  
This regularity is supported by the Immigrant Council of Ireland, which claims that 
the permanent residence should be followed by the “access to citizenship of the 
Member States in which a (labour) migrant has been legally resident for a significant 
length of time.”(244) Ireland considers harmonising the periods of residence enabling 
application for citizenship in all MS as crucial. They clearly state that it is the duty of 
the EU to develop European immigration policy by taking over some of the 
competences enjoyed by the national authorities, and the countries should 
acknowledge that the whole Community is a region of immigration; therefore, they 
should not insist on maintaining national sovereignty in this area.(245) However, if we 
take into consideration the agreement achieved in Maastricht, does the EU have a right 
to put forward such a demand? This article will not try to answer this question. Its 
emergence, however, shows that the Directive exerts some influence on amending 
national citizenship regulations.  
3.5.4. Conclusions  
Harmonisation of the rules concerning long-term residents has exerted an impact on 
MS nationality legislations. One may wonder whether the EU Council had such an 
intention while adopting the Directive, or was it perhaps focused exclusively on 
Page 28 of 54EIoP: Text 2006-005: Full Text
improving the position of third country nationals. However, it seems highly 
improbable that the Council did not realise the consequences, the Directive could have 
on granting national (and therefore Union) citizenship. On the bases of the above 
discourse it may be claimed that the EU was not satisfied with endowing long-term 
residents with a set of rights enshrined in the Directive; hence it indirectly pressured 
the MS to facilitate permanent migrant access to national citizenship. This action 
suggests that the EU aims at ensuring long-term residents the status of Union 
citizenship, but is aware that it does not hold the adequate competence.  
Therefore, the Council put such a strong emphasis on the significance of non-EU 
nationals’ presence in the Community (as they contribute to the common wealth), and 
the Directive can be seen as a signal that including permanent residents into societies 
as the full members is required. Notwithstanding the provisions agreed on in 
Maastricht, the EU aspires to influence the setting of conditions determining access to 
national citizenship. Although no official recommendations have been issued, the 
implicit hints do not leave any doubts about the desirable effects that the Council 
seeks to achieve: the MS with restrictive citizenship policies should facilitate 
integration of permanent non-EU residents. Adjusting to the EU trends is presented as 
a golden means to ensure better functioning of the nationally diverse societies as well 
as the whole Union. For the first time an official Community act has clear implications 
for the desirable amendments in nationality legislations of some MS.  
These indirect, but clear suggestions were recognised by both advocates and 
adversaries of the harmonisation of immigration and nationality regulations. An 
attempt to trigger a redesign of national citizenship policies was welcomed and 
supported by the countries traditionally open to migrants, and highly criticised by the 
states attached to national homogeneity. The reaction of both sides confirms the 
awareness of all MS that the EU institutions are becoming more and more involved in 
shaping citizenship policies. The question arises whether they will continue sending 
hidden messages, which can be either followed or neglected by MS authorities, or they 
will begin using more explicit means.  
4. Conclusions   
At the outset it must be stressed that the essence of the European Union lies in a 
permanently ongoing process of integration. Europe is becoming a more and more 
consolidated polity, and citizenship has an important role in this.  
Notwithstanding the attempts to regard the institution of EU citizenship “as so slight 
as [to be] almost meaningless”(246), it in fact stays at the heart of upheavals reshaping 
European politics.(247) As shown in the beginning of the third chapter,(248) 
Community citizenship has contributed to the growing interdependence of MS 
national citizenship policies. The Spanish case illustrates perfectly that the decisions 
concerning citizenship taken by one EU country, due to the freedom of movement 
inherent in Union citizenship, affect other members of the Community.(249) This 
situation created a need to harmonise national legislations, but most of the MS 
strongly opposed delegation of powers in this domain to the EU, as nationality policy 
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is associated with state sovereignty. In this regard, evolution of citizenship at the EU 
level interfered with the traditional understanding of this notion. For centuries 
citizenship belonged to the hard core of state sovereignty. Indeed, as Maas pointed 
out, “modern citizenship would have no meaning without the existence of states; 
conversely, states would not be states without citizens.”(250) Hence, the MS retained 
the autonomy in conferring national citizenship, and the status of EU citizen remained 
strictly bound to MS nationality.  
Nevertheless, the debate on citizenship was launched and different proposals on a 
post-modern concept of citizenship emerged. As Soysal suggested, “it is essential to 
recognise that national citizenship is no longer an adequate concept upon which to 
base a perceptive narrative of membership”.(251) Although the relationship observed 
between citizenship and identity(252) may indicate the simplicity of enhancing 
collective identity in any group just by granting a set of certain rights, the reality 
proves to be much more complex. The main obstacle is the fact that the status of 
citizen is by many still perceived as reserved exclusively for a member of the nation-
state, which remains the main level of political affiliation. Hence, the notion of Union 
citizenship itself caused general apprehension among the Member States.(253) Despite 
legal provisions, acquiring EU citizenship is believed to interfere with national 
citizenship. Therefore, if national citizenship is considered equivalent to national 
identity, then adopting European citizenship could produce a conceptual conflict 
within the individual. However, the latest surveys on sharing several layers of identity 
imply that a concept of citizenship will be no longer be associated mainly with 
national identity. In other words, the increasing awareness of belonging to two 
different political communities may eliminate apprehensions to combine two levels of 
identities, one corresponding to the nation-state and another to the European Union.  
These gradual changes in understanding the notion of citizenship constitute the 
essence of a postmodern ‘ethic of citizenship’, which is “an expression of pluralism, 
and of participatory democracy, complemented by a conception of identity.”(254) As 
the boundaries of identification in Europe remain fluid, the European Union appears to 
be an archetypal postmodern polity.(255) Introducing Union citizenship suggests that 
the general concept of citizenship is also likely to evolve beyond the nation state and 
beyond modernism, with potentially important implications for the loyalty of 
individuals to states and the EU.  
The appropriate mechanism of change is reflexive harmonisation. It appears to 
embody an optimal compromise between the need for unity and the need to respect 
national sovereignty and diversity. In the case of citizenship MS will not respond well 
to coercion, and will not accept hard law, but do appear to be aware of external 
pressures. In such situations the reflexive approach suggests that the most effective 
regulatory interventions are those that seek to obtain their goals indirectly instead of 
providing a direct prescription.  
These considerations suggest a role for soft law instruments. As Bothe says, soft law 
often serves as “a compromise between sovereignty and order”.(256) Therefore, soft 
law is used more frequently nowadays; especially the Open Method of Co-ordination, 
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which is simultaneously a soft law instrument and a new form of governance, is 
gaining popularity. Due to its voluntary character and consistence with the principle of 
subsidiarity, it is accepted in an increasing number of EU areas of responsibility. The 
OMC focuses on establishing general guidelines, leaving MS discretion in choosing 
the most suitable national strategy, and promotes mutual learning through peer 
reviews, which means it fulfils all the assumptions of (desirable) reflexive 
harmonisation. It is held up as a (partial) answer to the problems concerning multi-
level governance. Therefore, it may be suggested that the OMC could be applied even 
in such a sensitive domain as national citizenship policy.  
Even without this, as the notion of European citizenship with its unique entitlements 
and allegiances takes hold, citizenship regimes in Europe are being reassessed. The 
rights and duties attached to national citizenship are increasingly compared and 
contrasted between the Member States, and the most extreme differences are slowly 
eased out. The convergence is occurring – the general EU trend reveals that states 
whose nationality law is relatively closed to migrants tend to relax their regulations, 
while states where the status of citizen is comparatively easy to acquire tend to make 
the rules stricter.(257) This trend of decreasing discrepancies is very well visible 
through the new citizenship regulations, which have been applied in Germany since 
2000,(258) and in Ireland since 2005.(259) These examples show how extremely 
different citizenship legislations are becoming more similar due to the EU pressures. 
Although the decisions about the reforms were taken during sovereign democratic 
processes at the national level, both German and Irish governments admitted the need 
for transforming their regulations to the ‘EU average’. The substantial changes in 
conditions of granting national citizenship are undoubtedly the response to the 
unofficial demands of other MS and the indirect requirements of the ‘acquis 
communautaire’.  
What is worth emphasizing in both cases is that the authorities had to struggle with a 
very strong opposition, which tried to object to following the emerging EU trend. 
Despite these obstacles the amendments were implemented, but as the German 
example revealed, the transformation, in the absence of its adversaries, could have 
been even more significant.  
Quite unusual in this situation is the position taken by Spain, which did not hesitate to 
oppose the EU trend.(260) The Spanish government, by introducing amnesty for 
illegal immigrants in 2005, ignored the critical voices from other EU countries. It 
refused to consider the problems and needs of its co-members, while implementing 
changes that had the EU-wide effects.  
Another interesting point to be made concerns the general principle of adopting 
national citizenship. Convergence of nationality laws also entails convergence of ideas 
about belonging. The EU trend is towards a compromise, with Ireland moving away 
from strict ius soli in order to prevent citizenship being too easily accessible, while 
Germany accepted that strict ius sanguinis was no longer tolerable. An emerging 
consensus rejecting ideologies of citizenship in favour of pragmatic social engineering 
is a possible interpretation and an important development. 
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Another important conclusion to be drawn from this article concerns to the position of 
long-term non-EU residents after establishment of Union citizenship. The relative 
deterioration of their position reawakened the idea of linking Union citizenship to the 
place of residence. Proponents argue that “the subjective standard of nationality will 
gradually yield its place to the objective standard of residence or domicile.”(261) In 
fact, accepting country of residence as a criterion qualifying for EU citizenship could 
be interpreted as the logical consequence of leaving aside the ethno-cultural model of 
citizenship.  
The Member States do not seem ready for this, being more attuned with Weiler’s view 
that “one cannot, conceptually and psychologically (let alone legally) be a European 
citizen without being a Member State national”(262) and the long-term residents 
directive embodies a different approach, decreasing the discrepancies between EU and 
non-EU citizens. However, the outcome of this EU legal act has a much wider scope; 
it indirectly pressures the MS with restrictive nationality policies to facilitate access to 
national citizenship. Although the Community does not have competence to regulate 
conditions of acquiring national citizenship, it may be stated that the Council, through 
the provisions enshrined in this Directive, has given an implicit hint that conferring 
EU citizenship on long-term residents is required due to their contribution to the 
common wealth. As it is difficult to believe that such a signal might have been sent 
unintentionally, the attitude of the EU on equalizing the position of third country 
nationals permanently residing in the EU with that hold by Union citizens becomes 
clear. This deliberately partially hidden message is the first official attempt to induce 
certain amendments in MS independent nationality laws. Can we expect further 
actions of the EU institutions aiming at transforming national citizenship rules so they 
would help to obtain this Community goal?  
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